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THE UNITED STATES SHOULD WITHDRAW
ITS RESERVATIONS TO THE GENOCIDE
CONVENTION: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR PAUST'S PROPOSAL
MariaFrankowska *
On November 25, 1988, the United States became a party to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. I The Senate's thirty-six year procrastination in giving its advice
and consent to the Convention's ratification was an international embarrassment. 2 Now, conditions imposed by the Senate on the United
States' participation in the Convention have become the main target of
criticism. 3 In an article published recently in this journal, Professor
Jordan J. Paust convincingly demonstrates how several reservations
• Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law.
1. Genocide Convention, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. The United
States ratified the Genocide Convention on Nov. 25, 1988. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL: STATUS AS AT 31 DEC. 1989 at 97, U.N. Doe. ST/
LEG/SER.E/7, U.N. Sales No. E.89.V.6 (1989) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES].

2. The United States was one of the original signatories to the Convention. The U.S. Representative signed the Convention on December 11, 1948. Out of 43 original signatories to the
Convention, 70% ratified it by 1954. Bolivia, the Dominican Republic and Paraguay, which still
have not ratified the Convention, were for many years, together with the United States, the only
original signatories that refused to join the Convention. As of December 31, 1989, 100 States
were parties to the Convention. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 1, at 97-98. President Truman transmitted the Convention to the Senate, and the Foreign Relations Committee
held its first hearings on it in 1950. For a discussion of the ratification process, see, e.g., LeBlanc,
The Intent to Destroy Groups In the Genocide Convention: The Proposed U.S. Understanding, 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 369 (1984).

3. The conditions include two reservations and five so-called "understandings." For the text,
see MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 1, at 101. For a criticism of the reservations, see, e.g.,
LeBlanc, supra note 2, at 382-84. Several countries objected to the U.S. reservations. States that
objected to the first U.S. reservation excluding obligatory jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice, provided for in article 9 of the Convention, include: Greece, Italy, the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom. The Netherlands' objection regards the U.S. reservation as incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, thus precluding the Convention's entry into
force between the United States and the Netherlands. Australia and Brazil did not object to the
U.S. reservation, although they had objected to similar reservations made to article 9 by other
countries, including the Soviet Union and East European countries. The Soviet Union, the
Beylorussian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR and Hungary have recently withdrawn their reservations
to article 9. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 1, at 105. States that objected to the second
United States reservation (indicating that the United States will not be bound by the Convention
to take any action which is deemed to be prohibited by the U.S. Constitution) include: Denmark,
Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The objections were justified on the grounds that the reservation is contrary to the general
principle of international law granting primacy to international rules over internal law, or that
the reservation creates uncertainty as to the extent of obligations which the United States is
willing to assume under the Convention.
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and understandings attached to the U.S. instrument of ratification at
the request of the Senate seriously undermine the scope of U.S. obligations under the Convention. 4 The United States' unilateral redefinition of the term "genocide," resulting in a significant limitation of the
scope of the term, is particularly improper.5 Professor Paust maintains that this reformulation is so "fundamentally incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty" that it is not only "legally unacceptable," but most probably "has been obviated by the development
'6
of a customary international law."
Professor Paust concludes his analysis of the consequences that
this and other reservations might have for the application of the Convention with a plea that either the Senate withdraw its "unjust understanding" or "[i]f such does not occur voluntarily, the ... President
should withdraw our 'ratification' of the treaty and send the treaty
back to the Senate." '7 I agree with Professor Paust's insightful assessment of the limitations imposed by the Senate on the United States'
participation in the Genocide Convention. I also share his view that
4. Paust, Congress and Genocide: They're Not Going To Get Away With It, 11 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 90, 95-100 (1989). Generally speaking, there may be a difference between reservations and
understandings on the U.S. domestic plane. See, e.g., The Role of the Senate in Treaty Ratification, A Staff Memorandum to the Committee on Foreign Relations (1977), reprinted in 2 M.
GLENNON & T. FRANCK, UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: DOCUMENTS AND
SOURCES 7, 11-20 (1980); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 314 comments a, d (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Under international
law, however, as long as understandings are incorporated in the instrument of ratification and
meet the characteristics of the definition of reservation, they will be treated as reservations. According to article 2(l)(d) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a reservation means
"a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying,
accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the
legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, (1969), 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969),
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 681 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. It seems that the U.S.
understandings to the Genocide Convention are within the confines of that definition. See, e.g., I.
SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 51-54 (2d ed. 1984). See also
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 99TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
16 (Comm. Print 1985), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 760 (1989) (equating international effects of understandings with those of reservations). For the purposes of this article, the term "reservations"
includes understandings.
5. The understanding regarding the definition of "genocide" provides "[tihat the term 'intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such' appearing in
article II means the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic,
racial or religious group as such by the acts specified in article II." MULTILATERAL TREATIES,
supra note 1,at 101.
6. Paust, supra note 4, at 94-95. The other parties to the Convention have not, however,
objected to any of the U.S. understandings. Therefore, the position that the understanding in
question is fundamentally incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty has not yet been
supported by state action. The silence of States with regard to the five U.S. understandings may,
however, indicate that other parties to the Convention have refused to recognize those understandings as reservations.
7. Paust, supra note 4, at 104.
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"[i]t is time, finally, to ratify the Genocide Convention intact." 8 What
I would like to explore, however, is a different route to that end. I
believe that the United States should withdraw the objectionable reservations by depositing relevant notification with the Secretary General
of the United Nations, who acts as the Convention's depository. 9 I
shall first explain why this procedure is preferable to those proposed
by Professor Paust. I will then discuss the international and domestic
legal aspects of the withdrawal process.
I.

WITHDRAWAL OF RESERVATIONS

The Senate's withdrawal of the reservations, suggested by Professor Paust, would be a symbolic gesture devoid of international legal
effects. The Senate, acting independently, does not have the capacity
to change U.S. obligations on an international plane. The President is
the sole constitutional representative of the United States with respect
to external affairs. ° Moreover, any such action by the Senate would
also be devoid of any domestic effects. In particular, the Senate's decision to withdraw reservations would not be binding on the President.
Conversely, the withdrawal of reservations by the United States government, acting at the request of the President, would effectively
change the scope of U.S. obligations vis-i-vis other parties to the
Convention.
The withdrawal of reservations by the U.S. government is also a
better solution than a "withdrawal of ratification," the other means
proposed by Professor Paust. To be exact, a ratification of a treaty
cannot be withdrawn." After its ratification took effect, the United
States could only withdraw its participation in the Genocide Convention by denouncing the treaty. Denunciation is allowed under the
Convention, 12 but the right to denounce is limited. Article XIV precludes the United States from denouncing the Convention before the
8. Id.
9. See Genocide Convention, supra note 1, at art. XVII.
10. As the Supreme Court has stated, "The President [i]s the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). More recently, the Court upheld the broad view of presidential foreign
affairs powers. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981). See also L. HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 37-65 (1972).
11. Fitzmaurice, Law of Treaties, First Report, [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 104, 114,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/101. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not provide for
such a possibility. For provisions on various methods of denunciation and withdrawal from a
treaty, see Vienna Convention, supra note 4, at part V, § 3, arts. 54-62.
12. The denunciation may be effected by a written notification addressed to the Secretary
General of the United Nations. See Genocide Convention, supra note 1,at art. XIV.
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expiration of a five-year period after joining the Convention. '3 More
importantly, the denunciation of the Genocide Convention and "sending the treaty back to the Senate" would create a serious risk that the
United States again would not be a party to the Convention for a
lengthy period of time. In contrast, the withdrawal of the reservations
by the U.S. government is a risk-free procedure. While the action is
being effectuated, the United States will continue its participation in
the Convention. If, for any reason, the action fails, the U.S. position
with regard to the Convention will not be any more deplorable than it
is now.
II.

INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

On an international plane, the withdrawal procedure is relatively
simple and may be executed instantly. The Genocide Convention is
silent on the making and withdrawing of reservations.' 4 Thus, the
customary international law of treaties regulates the relevant reservation process. The law has been codified by the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties of 1969.15 The United States, although not formally bound by the Vienna Convention, recognizes most of its provisions as binding on the United States as a matter of customary
international law. 16 The provisions on reservations are among those
so recognized.1 7 Article 22, adopted without formal vote by the U.N.
Conference on the Law of Treaties, 18 provides for an unrestricted right
13. Article XIV provides that the Convention shall "remain in effect for a period of ten years
as from the date of its coming into force. It shall thereafter remain in force for successive periods
of five years for such Contracting Parties as have not denounced it at least six months before the
expiration of the current period." Genocide Convention, supra note 1,at art. XIV. The earliest
date that the United States could terminate its participation in the Convention in accordance
with article XIV would be November 25, 1993. The notice of denunciation would have to be
deposited at least six months earlier.
14. The absence of such provisions gave rise to a notorious ICJ Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951
I.C.J. 15. The International Court established therein a flexible system for reservations to multilateral conventions which was eventually adopted in the Vienna Convention. See Vienna Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 19-23. See also Edwards, Reservations to Treaties, 10 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 362, 388-401 (1989).
15. Vienna Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 19-23.
16. The Secretary of State's letter of submittal described the Vienna Convention as "generally recognized as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice." Secretary Rogers'
Report, 65 DEP'T ST. BULL. 684, 685 (1971). For further discussion of U.S. acceptance of the
rules of the Vienna Convention as binding as a matter of customary law, see Frankowska, The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 281,
295-301 (1988).
17. Secretary Rogers' Report, supra note 16, at 685. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, at

§ 313.

18. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, 2d sess., Apr. 9-May 22, 1969 (29th plen. mtg.)
at paras. 8-13, 159-60, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/II/Add.I (1970).
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to withdraw reservations. It stipulates that "unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation may be withdrawn at any time and the
consent of a State which has accepted the reservation is not required
for its withdrawal."' 19 The only condition that must be met for the
reservation's withdrawal to be effective is that "notice of it has been
received" by other contracting States. 20 Depositing the withdrawal
notification with the U.N. Secretary General will meet this notice
requirement.

III.

DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS

On the U.S. domestic plane, the basic procedural issue would be
whether the withdrawal of the reservations requires the Senate's advice and consent or whether such action may be taken by the President
acting alone. The power to make reservations is shared by the Senate
and the President. It is well established that when the President attaches reservations to a treaty in submitting the treaty to the Senate,
the adoption of those reservations requires the advice and consent of
the Senate. When the Senate qualifies its advice and consent to the
ratification of a treaty by its own reservations, the President must attach such conditions to the U.S. ratification of the treaty. On the
other hand, the President may refuse to ratify the treaty if he believes
that the Senate's reservations would make U.S. participation in the
21
treaty undesirable.
This allocation of power over reservation procedure seems to restrict the ability of the President to withdraw the reservations independently. 22 The issue has not attracted much attention from
commentators, 23 and there is little State practice in the area. 24 One
could analogize the withdrawal of reservations to either termination or
modification of a treaty. Both analogies seem proper as all instances
involve an alteration of preexisting rights and obligations under a
19. Vienna Convention, supra note 4, at art. 22(1).
20. Id. at art. 22(3). The withdrawal of a reservation must be formulated in writing. Id. at
art. 23(4).
21. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, at § 314; Glennon, The Senate Role in Treaty Ratification, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1983).
22. Arguably, the President could, acting alone, withdraw those reservations that he formulated but would need the Senate's cooperation to withdraw reservations made by that body. The
Restatement on the Foreign Relations Law provides that the advice and consent of the Senate is
required for the withdrawal of reservations but does not distinguish between the two kinds of
reservations. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, at § 314 reporter's notes.

23. The issue is not discussed in, for example, HENKIN, supra note 10; M. GLENNON & T.
FRANCK, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (1987); M. WHITEMAN, 14
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1970).

24. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
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treaty. In an analogy to treaty termination, it is well established that
the President can independently terminate a treaty. 25 Thus, following
the whole-implies-the-lesser logic, one could argue that since the President has the authority to act alone in terminating a treaty, he or she
can also modify the treaty or withdraw reservations without the Senate's advice and consent. However, this argument seems contrary to
the constitutional mandate that the President and the Senate share responsibility in the making of treaties. To allow the President to withdraw the Senate's reservations after ratification without the Senate's
advice and consent would effectively nullify the Senate's power in the
treaty process. The Senate's advice and consent in the form of reservations would become a meaningless exercise if the President could withdraw those reservations once the treaty is in effect. 26 The crucial point
is that while treaty termination results in eliminating the United
States' obligations on the international level, the withdrawal of reservations expands such obligations, thus making the Senate's involvement more significant.
Analogizing this procedure to treaty modification suggests that the
Senate should be consulted. As a rule, the President cannot modify
U.S. treaty obligations without the Senate's involvement. In fact, the
Senate has given its formal consent to treaty modifications on several
occasions. 27 At least once, however, this practice was not followed.
In a sui generis case, the Executive, acting alone, added new reserva25. See L. HENKIN, supra note 10, at 136. President Jimmy Carter's termination of the
Mutual Security Treaty with the Republic of China serves as a good example. For a discussion
of an abortive attempt by several U.S. senators to challenge the authority of the President to
terminate the Treaty, see Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (the Supreme Court
vacated the judgment of the lower court and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the
complaint; four Justices maintained that the case presented a political question beyond the
Court's cognizance). See also M. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 145-61 (1990).
26. See Glennon, Nicaragua v. US.: Constitutionality of U.S. Modification of ICJ Jurisdiction, 79 AM. J. INT'L. L. 682, 687-89 (1985).
27. For instances of treaty modification where the Senate's advice and consent was obtained,
see, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S. DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE 401-02
(1977) (discussing the ratification of the protocol done on Sept. 30, 1977, relating to an amendment to the Convention on International Civil Aviation adopting an authentic Russian language
text of the Convention); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S. DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE 237 (1974) (reporting the adoption of an amendment to the text of art. VIII of the 1965
Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic). The State Department, however,
has stated that, while a significant alteration of the terms of the existing treaty requires the
consent of the Senate, the President "may interpret a treaty and secure the agreement of the
other party or parties for a particular interpretation or method of implementation" acting alone.
See Treaty Termination: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 214 (1979).
The dispute between the Senate and the President over interpretation of the Treaty between
the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) illustrates that the power to interpret may be as limited as modifying a treaty in contravention to the Senate's wishes. See, e.g., 26 I.L.M. 282-312 (1987). See
also L. Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 406, 412-15 (1989).
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tions to the U.S. Declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice. 28 The United States regarded this
action as a modification of its treaty obligations, whereas the International Court of Justice characterized it as tantamount to a
29
termination.
Direct U.S. precedent on the process of withdrawal of treaty reservations is rare, but illuminating. Although not denying that other
cases exist, the State Department provided information on only one
instance of the withdrawal of a reservation: 30 the 1987 withdrawal of
the reservation made to the 1970 Patent Cooperation Treaty. 3 1 This
case is analogous to the suggested withdrawal of reservations to the
Genocide Convention, and the procedure established therein should be
followed.
The Patent Cooperation Treaty was ratified by the United States in
1973 subject to three declarations in pursuance of the advice and consent of the Senate. 32 One of the declarations was a reservation under
article 64(1)(a) of the Treaty to the effect that the United States would
not be bound by the provisions of chapter II forming an optional part
of the Treaty. When the decision to withdraw the reservation was
considered, the Department of State, joined on this point by the De28. On April 6, 1984, Secretary of State George P. Shultz sent a letter to the U.N. Secretary
General modifying the U.S. 1946 Declaration, 61 Stat. 1218 (1947), which had accepted the
International Court of Justice's optional compulsory jurisdiction under article 36, paragraph 2,
of the Statute of the International Court. 23 I.L.M. 670 (1984). In this letter two reservations
were added to the Declaration. The Senate did not participate in the decision to add the new
reservations, although it gave its advice and consent to the Declaration when it was originally
made. The case is sui generis since it is unclear to what extent the rules of the law of treaties are
applicable to declarations accepting ICJ compulsory jurisdiction. For an in-depth discussion of
the domestic legal aspects of that action, see Glennon, supra note 26; Glennon, Constitutional
Issues in Terminating US. Compulsory Jurisdiction, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
AT A CROSSROADS 447, 456-57 (L. Damrosch ed. 1987).

29. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 392, 398 (Judgment of Nov. 26).
30. This information was kindly provided to the author by Mr. John R. Crook, the current
head of the Treaty Office in the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State. On the
international practice of reservation withdrawals, see, e.g., R. SZAFARZ, ZASTRZEZENIA DO
TRAKTAT6W

WIELOSTRONNYCH

(RESERVATIONS

TO

MULTILATERAL

TREATIES)

250-61

(1974). Professor Szafarz reported 32 cases of reservation withdrawals prior to 1974. All withdrawals involved nations other than the United States. Examples of withdrawals include:
France's withdrawal of a reservation to the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1953),
reportedin 381 U.N.T.S. 409; Canada's withdrawal of a reservation to the Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949), reported in 538 U.N.T.S. 333; and
New Zealand's withdrawal of a reservation to the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations (1946), reported in 270 U.N.T.S. 372.
31. The Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, T.I.A.S. No. 8733. The
President requested advice and consent regarding the withdrawal of a reservation made to the
Treaty on July 31, 1984. 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Treaty Doc. 98-29. The case was reported in 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 889 (1984).

32. See Proclamation by the President, 28 U.S.T. 7645, T.I.A.S. No. 8733.
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partment of Commerce, requested that the matter be submitted to the
Senate for its advice and consent. 33 This procedure was followed and
the President's message to the Senate on transmitting the treaty acknowledged the need for the Senate's participation in the decision34
making process.
The reasons justifying the Senate's involvement in the withdrawal
of the reservation to the Patent Cooperation Treaty would be applicable to the withdrawal of reservations to the Genocide Convention. In
both cases the reservations originated in the Senate. The President
could not have ratified the treaties without those reservations. Moreover, the reservation to the Patent Cooperation Treaty, like the reservations to the Genocide Convention, sought to limit U.S. obligations.
The withdrawal of the reservation to the Patent Treaty resulted in an
extension of the scope of the Treaty as applied to the United States
and the imposition of additional obligations on the United States, thus
making the Senate's involvement proper. Likewise, the withdrawal of
the reservations to the Genocide Convention would broaden U.S. obligations under the Convention. Under the circumstances, the Senate's
advice and consent to the withdrawal of reservations is warranted.
Congress as a whole was also involved in the withdrawal procedure concerning a reservation to the Patent Cooperation Treaty. After
the Senate's advice and consent, but before the President's action on
an international plane, Congress enacted legislation necessary to implement the withdrawal domestically. 35 As Professor Paust mentions
in his article, the legislation Congress passed to implement the Genocide Convention incorporates the reservations and understandings attached to the U.S. ratification of the Convention.3 6 If the reservations
to the Genocide Convention are to be withdrawn, the enactment of
new implementing legislation should precede any action by the President on an international plane, just as in the case of the withdrawal of
37
the reservation to the Patent Cooperation Treaty.
33. See Letter of Submittal, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Treaty Doc. 98-29, at VI. The fact that the
opinion of the State Department and the Department of Commerce as to the Senate's participation was sought implies that the matter was unclear. The decision whether the Senate's advice
and consent was necessary was made ad hoc rather than undertaken in conformity with a well
established procedure.
34. "To ensure that our domestic laws conform with our expanded international obligations,
I do not plan to notify the Director General of the withdrawal of our reservation to chapter II
until after the Senate has informed me of its advice and consent to the withdrawal and Congress
has enacted all legislation necessary to implement that withdrawal domestically." President's
Message to the Senate Transmitting the Patent Cooperation Treaty, 1984 PUB. PAPERS 1102,
1103 (July 27, 1984).
35. See Proclamation by the President, 28 U.S.T. 7645, T.I.A.S. No. 8733.
36. Paust, supra note 4, at 99.
37. It is questionable whether the Convention, as modified by the international withdrawal of
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CONCLUSION

The simplicity of the procedure does not make the task of changing the posture of the United States toward the Genocide Convention
easy. The political will to embrace wholeheartedly the obligations
under the Genocide Convention as originally drafted is badly needed.
Professor Paust's questionnaires addressed to U.S. international law
experts have identified a group of potential supporters of the idea. 38
Their views, publicly and vigorously expressed, may energize public
opinion on this issue, paving the way for the desired change.

the reservations, would override the previously passed legislation according to the supremacy
clause of article VI of the U.S. Constitution, declaring treaties and federal laws to be the supreme
law of the land. Under the well established last-in-time rule, any treaty overrides earlier inconsistent legislation. As stated by the Supreme Court: "By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the
same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that
instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the
other. . . . [I]f the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other, provided
always the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing." Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190, 194 (1888). For a challenging discussion of the rule, see, e.g., Paust, Rediscovering the
Relationship Between CongressionalPower and InternationalLaw: Exceptions to the Last in Time
Rule and the Primacyof Custom, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 393 (1988). See also L. HENKIN, supra note
10, at 137-40.
However, courts may preclude the application of the last-in-time rule by declaring the treaty
to be non-self-executing. See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718 (1952). See also Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S. v. Postal: Win at Any Price?, 74 AM. J.
INT'L L. 892 (1980); Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J.INT'L L. 760 (1988). The existence
of the legislation implementing the Genocide Convention makes such a declaration with regard
to the eventually adopted version of the Convention highly probable. Thus, to avoid any
problems with the self-executing character of the Convention's modified text, the Congress
should pass enabling legislation for implementing the effects of the withdrawal of reservations in
the domestic sphere.
38. Paust, supra note 4, at 91 n.1, 93 n.3. The majority of U.S. international law experts who
responded to the questionnaires share the same basic assumptions concerning genocide. They
believe that genocide constitutes a violation ofjus cogens and is a crime over which there is
universal jurisdiction. Id.

